keynote Presidential address to announce that a world-wide anti-partition propaganda campaign would form the basis of Fianna Fáil's partition policy in the post-war period 7 .
3
Following Fianna Fáil's relegation to opposition in February 1948 de Valera decided to commence his much anticipated world-wide anti-partition campaign. Never before or after did Fianna Fáil place such importance on the employment of anti-partition propaganda. The premise of this article is that de Valera's world-wide anti-partition campaign was a policy of futility. His use of propaganda both abroad and in Ireland was a failure. His speeches during his worldwide enterprise reinforced Ulster Unionists' convictions that a united Ireland was impossible, highlighted the American government's lack of interest towards ending the partition of Ireland, and confirmed to the British government that Irish unity was unattainable without the support of the majority of citizens within Northern Ireland.
Dev's tour stage 1: from New York to New Delhi, March -June 1948 4 In March 1948 de Valera commenced the first stage of his anti-partition tour. He spent the following four months travelling almost 50,000 miles, visiting the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and India. The first stop was the country of his birth, America. He arrived in New York on 4 March 1948. It was almost twenty years since de Valera last visited America. Accompanied by his loyal lieutenant Frank Aiken, the Irish delegation was greeted with an enthusiastic welcome from Irish-Americans. Frank Gallagher, director of the Government Information Bureau from 1939 to 1948, recalled that a parade through New York's main thorough-fares, in honour of de Valera, was the biggest seen since the end of World War II 8 . De Valera travelled 10,000 miles over three weeks, visiting Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Oklahoma, San Francisco and Philadelphia. 5 De Valera's speeches in America had two dominant themes: that the partition of Ireland was illegal, and that the British government should make a declaration in support of Irish unity. That Ireland was illegally divided constituted the main argument in most of de Valera's anti-partition speeches while in America. In every city, town and village he visited he spoke of the crime of a divided Ireland and against the illegality of the "Partition Act" of 1920 9 . He routinely declared that Northern Ireland was "not a historic entity 10 " and instead exclaimed that partition had divided "the ancient nation of Ireland 11 ".
6
His visit to America in 1948 was the ideal opportunity to propagate the anti-partitionist orthodoxy that laid claim to Northern Ireland as the stolen and sundered "Six Counties". From the inception of the Northern Ireland state, following the British government's passing of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Irish nationalists had refused to accept the formal partition of Ireland into two separate political jurisdictions 12 . For the majority of nationalists, in both parts of Ireland, the right to rule of the Northern Ireland government was illegitimate. The Act was denounced as an "illegal Act" -forced upon the Irish by their British superiors 13 . De Valera repeatedly pronounced that no one in Ireland, including the unionist population, had voted for what they termed the "Partition Act 14 ".
7
That the British government should make a declaration in support of Irish unity was based on de Valera's assumption that because Britain had imposed partition it had a A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera's Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948 Campaign, -1951 Études irlandaises, 36-2 | 2012 responsibility to find an ultimate solution to the "Irish question 15 ". In America he demanded that Britain face its "moral obligations" and help end partition 16 . Speaking in San Francisco he was unequivocal: Ireland had been "mutilated" by the British government creating a situation where partition was the "outstanding cause of quarrel" between Britain and Ireland 17 .
8
Although during the late 1930s de Valera did receive a sympathetic hearing from the Neville Chamberlain government of his request for a declaration in support for Irish unity, by the conclusion of World War II the situation had changed drastically. Given Irish neutrality the British government maintained that Irish unity was an unattainable shortterm objective as Northern Ireland's war-time efforts and the strategic importance of the region in the context of a further war meant that the British would not agree to end partition. . 16 Privately, Nehru expressed his deep sympathy for the anti-partition cause in Ireland and noted that he saw Ireland as an ally to India in her quest for independence from Britain 34 . There were marked similarities between the partitioning of Ireland and India as both countries had been within the British Imperial system and in each case partition took place coincidentally in time with a transfer of power, although limited in the Irish case, to indigenous authorities 35 . 17 De Valera's time in India again exposed the limitations of the anti-partition propaganda campaign. A British official noted that de Valera's stay in India, given the lack of an Irish audience, "would deprive Mr de Valera of any field for anti-partition propaganda 36 ". One must acknowledge that de Valera was, first and foremost, a politician and thus his antipartition campaign abroad was predominantly for home consumption in Ireland, and not necessarily intended to offer any immediate solution to partition. 18 Nevertheless, even if an anti-partition propaganda campaign was the best way to practice his trade while in opposition, his methods merely confirmed that he was unable to deal with the political reality: Irish unity was unattainable in the medium-term. His time abroad showed his inability to foster a new approach to partition. His placing of the blame for partition on the shoulders of the British government, and his continued portrayal of Ireland as a wounded victim showed him to be politically sterile on the issue of Irish unity. This approach was, after all, a reiteration of his partition policy since the early 1920s. 21 The Belfast government, which kept a file on de Valera's anti-partition activities in Great Britain, sought to counteract any possible publicity that de Valera would secure during his anti-partition campaign 42 . The Stormont authorities had received reports from the Ulster Office in London that de Valera was making embarrassing speeches during his tour of Britain
43
. Under the authority of Northern Ireland minister for finance, John Maynard Sinclair, it was decided that "Ulster's war effort" and the "fact that the vast majority of our own people desire to remain in the UK" would constitute the central message of Ulster Unionists' counter-publicity campaign 44 .
22 If de Valera's trip to America had not been a success in propaganda terms, his campaign in Britain was doubly difficult. Hugh Delargy, British Labour politician and chairman of the Anti-Partition of Ireland League of Great Britain, had been present at most of the major meetings in Britain when de Valera spoke. Although he recalled that they were "enormous and enthusiastic meetings […], in the biggest cities", in retrospect, he believed that they were all flops. They were not political meetings at all. They were tribal rallies: tribesmen met to greet the Old Chieftain. 25 On entering government MacBride had become anxious that the partition issue was being used for party purposes as a result of de Valera's anti-partition propaganda campaign 50 . Thus, in April 1948, he made the decision that partition policy would be taken out of the hands of the government and handed over nominally to the newly formed All-Party AntiPartition Committee. The Committee consisted of the four major political parties, Fine Gael, Labour, Clann na Poblachta and Fianna Fáil. In forming the committee MacBride hoped that Fianna Fáil would no longer be able to exploit the freedom of opposition to embarrass the government on its partition policy; simply put, if all parties sat under the auspices of a partition committee, the chance to exploit government mistakes and make political capital from them was limited.
26 An unsigned and undated directive outlined the purpose of the Committee. It read:
The task of the committee should be primarily to assist in the creation of public opinion favourable to the unification of the country, in Ireland, Britain, in the United States, Australia and in such other parts of the world as may, from time to time, be expedient 51 .
27 The inaugural gathering of the Committee occurred in late January 1949. In attendance at the Mansion House in Dublin were Costello, MacBride, William Norton, Tánaiste and minister for Social welfare, de Valera and Aiken
52
. The first public initiative of the Committee was for the organisation of a campaign fund outside local churches, in support of Northern Nationalist anti-partitionist candidates in the Northern Ireland general election set for 10 February 1949. Northern Ireland Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke announced that "partition was to the main issue" of the general election 53 . Cross-border tensions had grown since de Valera's anti-partition propaganda campaign to America and Britain -he had overplayed his hand in his relationship with the Ulster Unionists. His tour of America had annoyed Stormont immensely, resulting in a return of megaphone diplomacy between Dublin and Belfast. 28 By early February 1949, the fundraising campaign for Northern Nationalist candidates had collected over £42,000 54 . The financial success of the campaign was not matched in the election itself, as Northern Nationalists performed poorly at the polls. The net result of southern politicians' interference in the Northern Ireland election was disastrous and merely seemed to contribute to the Ulster Unionist Party achieving one of its greatest victories in its history; the Northern Ireland Labour Party was all but wiped out at the polls and after its defeat decided to publicly declare its support for partition, while reactionaries regained the ascendancy within the Ulster Unionist Party 55 . 29 De Valera's involvement, although it may be argued reluctantly, with the All-Party AntiPartition Committee, further underlined his lack of vision on partition. On the one hand de Valera had appealed for a relationship based on goodwill with the Northern Ireland majority, who he hoped would convert 300,000 unionists to agree to a united Ireland. On the other hand his anti-partition propaganda campaign sought to expose the "evils of partition" and reveal the extent to which the Ulster Unionist regime discriminated against 32 Whitehall's decision to introduce the Ireland Act initiated a crisis in Anglo-Irish relations that had both immediate consequences for de Valera's anti-partition propaganda campaign, and ultimately long lasting significance for Irish nationalists' hopes for Irish unity. Significantly the introduction of the Act forced de Valera to acknowledge that his use of propaganda to help end partition had proved futile. Not since the introduction of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 had partition been so resolutely confirmed. From this moment onwards he was forced to concede that the ending of partition was a longterm aspiration rather than a medium-term objective. 33 De Valera was in London at the time of the declaration and the statement seemed to perturb him immensely. He felt that the Act was further evidence of the poisoning effect of partition on Anglo-Irish relations. His anti-partition propaganda speeches took on a new level of intensity not before seen during his propaganda campaign. He believed that the British had embarked on a "mad course" and instead of cementing good relations with Ireland they had chosen to "blow them up 60 ". He found it "hard to believe" and wrote that "it makes one desperate 61 ". 34 Privately, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee explained that because of Irish "aggression" in the context of Dublin's anti-partition campaign and the Republic of Ireland Act, he was fully prepared "to make it clear" that the British government 66 .
36 In London, in March 1951, in response to a question concerning a quick end to partition, de Valera's sense of melancholy was vividly apparent: "you can always say that a thing that will happen is nearer to happening to-day than it was yesterday 67 ." The Irish general election of May 1951 gave minimal attention to partition; instead the traditional election policies, the economy, social problems, emigration and Church-State relations dominated the campaign. De Valera was noticeably silent on the issue and rarely discussed partition during the campaign 68 . Gone were the hostile soundbites of previous years. Propaganda had been tried but had failed -paradoxically, this tactic had merely helped to entrench partition rather than help remove it. 37 De Valera's use of propaganda as a tool to preach the injustice of partition was a policy of futility. As Aldous Huxley poetically noted, "the propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain 69 ". De Valera was digging in vain. Perhaps he realised this as he never again embarked on an international anti-partition tour. He had learned a valuable lesson that propaganda only offered superficial success. His international campaign showed that the global community cared little about the partition of Ireland and Irish unity. 38 The extent to which de Valera's campaign alienated Ulster Unionists was significant. His unrelenting verbal assault against Ulster Unionists was a poisonous feature of his campaign and merely helped propagate the notion that unionism and Irishness were incompatible -that there could only be one or the other. Such actions revealed the naiveté of de Valera's approach to partition -he ridiculed those whom he admitted he required to achieve Irish unity. 39 De Valera's involvement with the anti-partition propaganda campaign in Ireland showed how unable he was to develop a new approach to tackle partition. He relied on outdated methods and philosophies. The All-Party Anti-Partition Committee's financial support of Northern Nationalist anti-partitionist candidates in the 1949 Northern Ireland general election was a political disaster that merely strengthened the hand of Ulster Unionists.
Conclusion
40 By early 1950, de Valera terminated his anti-partition campaign. He had by then realised that to expose the "injustice" of partition had merely exposed the inability of Irish 41 By the summer of 1951, he ordered that the Irish government cease to financially support the Irish Anti-Partition League in Northern Ireland and the Anti-Partition of Ireland League of Great Britain. He believed that both movements had no practical value because partition policy was the responsibility of the government and not of external lobby groups 71 . He likewise relinquished any meaningful association with the All-Party AntiPartition Committee 72 . 42 In government from 1951 to 1954 and from 1957 to 1959, during his final years in active politics, de Valera abandoned a propaganda-based anti-partition policy and replaced it with a policy of "persuasion" that sought to foster cross-border co-operation between Dublin and Belfast 73 . He was never again to advocate a policy of propaganda to help bring an end to partition. The 'sore thumb' approach of stressing the "crime" of a partitioned Ireland had run its course. Ernest Blythe eloquently appraised the futility of de Valera's anti-partition propaganda campaign: "Our speeches and articles about the injustice of partition […] must be likened to the shooting off of good ammunition at the smoke-trail of a ship which has passed by and is long out of range 74 ".
NOTES
3. The National Archives of Ireland (NAI) opened in 1991. Prior to this almost all governmental records were closed to the public; only those of the Department of the Taoiseach (DT) were available to researchers. A large volume of archival material dealing with partition in the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was not available to researchers until 1991. Archival material relating to this article from the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) and from the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK) did not become available to the public until the early 1990s.
